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Executive suinniarv 
1. . As the three republics of TranScaucasia, Georgia, Annenia and Azerbaijan, seek to come to 
grips with the problems caused by internal  conflict~ external isolation and economic collapse, 
the EU is increasingly seen there as a partner of  the first importance.· In 1994 the EU raised its 
profile considerably, with all three  benefiting from one of the largest single food  assiStance 
programmes the Conuriunity has ever carried out.  This wa.S in addition· to ongoing emergency 
humanitarian help to refugees and other particularly disadvantaged elements ofthe'"population; 
and. to the continued provision of  technical assistance. _FolloWing the cease-fires· in Abkhazia 
and  Nagomo-Karabakh  a]l  three  republics  requested  the  opening  of negotiations  on . full 
. Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs).  ,. 
. 2.  Despite the fragile cease-fires in 1994, the region continues to ~e  dominated by tl)e conflicts in 
Nagomo-Karabakh and Abkhazia:  These have exacerbated internal problems in Georgia and 
Azerbaijan in particular.  The economic situation is a  matter for serious concern,  and their. 
dependency ori humanitarian assistance is likelr to continue for several years. 
· 3.  · The EU ·has, inter alia, geopolitical and economic interests in the region.  It 'also haS  a moral 
interest  in  participating in  humanitarian activity  in a  part of the world which  is  a  bridge 
between Europe and Asia.  · 
A coordinated strategy is required to assist the three republics through what is  likely to be a 
lengthy transitional period, and eventually to _set the oonditions for sustained development 
4.  The  Union  can  establish  a  credible  strategy  towar~ the  three  republics  basect  upon th~-. 
negotiation,  under appropriate conditions, of a  PCA with each republic,· but this should  be 
supplemented by measures Intended to ensure the physical survival of  the population (food and 
humanitarian aid) and technical assistance for  post-war-recons~ction.  Exceptional financial 
·assis~ce is  an option to  be  Considered  in  the  context of IMF stand by arrangements  and· 
. would facilitate the repayment of  EC loans·.  · 
.5.  An overall strategy of  this kind would be virtually unprecedented in terms of both scope and 
. content.  If  implemented it would undoubtedly represe~t a major factor in the three  republi~s' 
future development and would give the Union very subStantial leverage  in the pursuit of its 
.objectives.  Accordingly, the Community should link its implementation tO progress in meeting. 
those objectives:  acceptance by all parties of  ea.Ch of  the republics' sovereignty, independence  .· 
and  territorial  integrity;  the  resolution of conflictS;  the  promotion  of political  refonn 
especially as regards human rights and democratic institutions;  the repatriation of refugees, 
and progress on economic reforms, all essential elements in achieving regional stability.  The 
presence of  the Community in the region is also essential in order to promote 'its interests in the 
.  . - ' energy sector.  . 
6.  A more' active  regional  and  bilateral  political  dialogue  with the  partners  and  with  Russia, 
Turkey. and the Economic CoOperation  Organisation of which Azerbaijan- is  a.  menibe~ can 
support the reconstruction process. 
7.  A  number  of 'components  of the  coordinated  strategy  (notably  in  the  field  of political 
cooperation, support for democratic institutions and possibly some fields  ofassistance) could 
be the object of a Co~on  Position.  A draft Common Position is  presented in conjunction 
with this Communication.  ·  · 
2 Annex A:  Suminary of  the economic situation iii  the Trariscaucasian region  . 
Annex B:  . · Trade between the EC and the Transcaucasian oountries .  .  · 
Annex C:  Summary ofTacis actiVities in Transcaucasia 
Annex D:  Checklist of  instruments for implementation of  a coordinated strategy. 
3 · Introduction 
-Towards a European Union strategy for relations 
.  with the Transcaucasian republics 
1.  As the three republics of Transcaucasia, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, seek to oome to. 
grips with the daunting problems caused by internal conflict, external isolation and 'economic 
collapse, the EU is increasingly seen there as a partner ofthe  fi~st importance.  In 1994 the EU 
raised. its profile considerably,  with all  three benefiting from  orie  of the largest single food 
assi~tance progran'unes the Community has ever carried out.  This was  in addition to ongoing 
emergency humanitarian help to  refugees  internally displaced persons and other particularly . 
. disadvantaged  eleme~ts  of the  population,  and · to  the'. rontinued .  provisio~ of technical 
assistance.  Following the ceaSe-fires in  Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh all three· republics 
requested the opening of  negotiations on full Partnership and Cooperation Agreenients.(PCAs). 
2. ·  If  only because of  the political arid economic conditionality the EC attaches to the conclusion 
of PCAs, the question of contractual relations cannot be treated in isolation from the internal 
state of these countries  .. Nor should it be divorced from the EU's ·existing policies as they are 
applied in the region. The purpose of  this comn1unication is therefore:  · 
• ·  to assess the EU's interests in Transcaucasia, 
·  •  to place EC actions th'ere to date in an overall context, 
•  to. assess the scope for further cooperation, including in the-field'of contractual relations, 
•  to . outline  possible  elements  of an  overall  strategy .  and  identifY  the  instruments  for  its 
implementation. 
Current state of the republics  ~ 
I. 
.  '• 
3.  · The region continues to be dominated by the conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and (to 
a lesser extent) South Ossetia.  Events in  recent months have demonstrated the difijculties in 
moving from  the ·current cease-fires towards  permanent political settlement.  The republics' 
efforts· to build democratic n,ational·institutions, particularly in Georgia and Azerbaijan where 
parts of the country became battle zopes and where large tracts of land are no  longer under 
central control, have been severely damaged.  Their economic state is also a matter for serious 
concern.  Again  in  Georgia. and ·Azerbaijan  the 
1 
problems  caused  by  internal  conflict  and 
political  instability,  and the  lack of institutions  capable of upholding the  rule of law,  have 
combined· with the  disruption  following  the  break-up  of the  Soviet  Union  to  reduce  once 
relatively. prosperous economies  to  a  state of prostration.  The  prospects  f9r. recovery  are 
variable.  · 
•  In  Georgia's  case,  no solution  is  on  the  horizon  regarding  the  repatriation  of Georgian 
refugees  (currently  numbering  280.000) to  Abkhazia;  and  the ·situation  has  become  mor~ 
critical following  gross human  rights  violations  against Georgian  returnees.  Internally,. the 
Abkhaz  conflict  has  accentuated  the  country's  endemic  difficulties  stemming  from  the 
. weakness  of the power  structure  and  of democratic  institutions,  which  has  favoured  the 
emergence of  comp~ting armed groups, political violence and organised crime· and which last 
year threatened to lead to a complete breakdown of  law and order.  Adjaria and South Ossetia 
are virtually autonomous.  Under these circumstances it remains to be seen whether President 
Shevardnadze will succeed  in  his current campaign to  reimpose a  measure of governmental 
. authority.  The collapse of the  industrial.fabric of these  countries  is  particularly marked  in 
Georgia,  where  industry  is  reported to  be  running  at less  than  10% of capacity and  where 
foreign  currency  res.erves  are  at  virtually. negligible  levels.  Between.  1990  and  1994,  the 
cumulative economic decline is  estimated at around 80% of GNP.  GNP per capita stood.at 
4 $563 in 1993  (Russia:  $2336).  Physical isolation from Russia due to the Abkhaz conflicts 
has exacerbated these effects. 
In the longer term, Georgia may be able to capitalise on the fact that its communications are 
better than those of  its neighbours, and its Black Sea ports are important assets.  But the sheer 
scale of economic decline  - Georgia is  virtually dependent on aid both for staple foods  and 
energy - and the degree of internal disorganisation make its case perhaps the most serious of 
the three. 
•  Armenia  has  been- able  to  maintain  outwardly  democratic  governmental  institutions. 
Nevertheless the anti-Turkish ARF ("Dashnak") opposition party was suspended in December 
1994  and  its  participation  in  the  Parliamentary  elections  set  for  July  1995  is  uncertain. 
Armenia's relatively ci>hesive society, and the contributions of its  diaspora, have helped it to 
survive the economic consequences of  the war and its virtual dependence on uncertain supply-
lines through Georgia (and, to a far lesser extent, Iran) due to the Turkish embargo and the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.  Nevertheless, GDP fell  by  about 70% from  1991  to 1993  and 
average wages stand at around $4-5 a month.  The country still suffers from serious shortages 
of staple foods, energy,  medicines and agricultural inputs.  Armenia is  the most advanced of 
the three towards implementation of  a serious economic reform programme and it is hoped that 
it has already passed the economic nadir, with a modest recovery  in  output forecast for this 
year.  The role of the diaspora will continue to be fundamental in this process.  The country's 
external financing situation remains, however, extremely fragile. 
•  In the  case of Azerbaijan  20% of the  national  territory  is  under  occupation,  including  a 
substantial swathe of hmd outside Nagorno-Karabagh itself.  The government is  struggling to 
cope with more than  one  million  refugees  and  internally  displaced  persons.  Human  rights 
organisations  have  attributed  blame  for  atrocities  to  both  sides.  The  cease-fire  has  been 
periodically broken, with front-line skirmishing and (in  March  1995) a flare-up in fighting on 
the north-west frontier. 
Political stability has been hard to achieve in Azerbaijan and President Aliev has consolidated 
his  rule following short-lived insurrections in  October  1994 and March  1995.  The "state of 
emergency"  introduced  after .the  October  coup  remains  in  force,  although  at  the  Joint 
Committee  on  10  March  the  Azerbaijani  side  said  it  will  be  lifted  before  elections  then 
scheduled for August 1995.  Azerbaijan's potential as an energy supplier is  considerable -as 
witness the willingness of  Western oil companies to commit huge sums despite very substantial 
political risk.  The recent agreement with the  international oil consortium (of which  51% is 
controlled by US  companies) covers the exploitation of only 7% of Azerbaijan's offshore oil 
reserves.  But for the  moment  it  is  still  dependent on  imports  of gas  and  staple foods,  and 
· desperately needs a period of  pe~ceful consolidation and some relief from the crushing refugee 
burden.  i 
4 .. An  overview of the  republics'  current economic  situation  is  annexed  at A.  All  three  have 
launched  refon:n  programmes;  the  IMF  has  already  agreed  loans  under  the  Systemic 
Transformation Facility with Georgia and Armenia, and most recently with Azerbaijan 1): 
It is  now  becoming clearer that the dependency of all three on  humanitarian assistance will 
continue for some time  - possibly,  in  the absence of political  solutions  to  the conflicts,' for 
several years.  · 
This view has been amply confirmed in dialogue with the three republics,  in  particular on the 
occasion of the Joint Committees  held  in  Brussels  in  December  1994  (Georgia)  and  March 
1995 (Armenia and Azerbaijan). 
l) Azerbaijan· is also negotiating a rehabilitation credit with the World Bank. 
5 '  '  ~. 
Role of  third countries 
5.1. A key element in an eventual resolution ofthe conflicts will be the attitude of  Russia.  It is not 
dear that Moscow conSiders that its interests in the region will  be best served by the pursuit of. 
political  settlements  brokered by the  OSCE or other mterrtational  bodies.  These  interests 
concern bo~  Azerbaijan's potential oil wealth (and the pipelines which would distribute it) and 
the defence  of the  CIS's  southern borders,  including  the  basing  of, Russian  troops  in  the 
republics:  (Armenia and-Georgia have cpncluded basing agreements;  Azerbaijan is refusing 
. to do  so)~  Finally, the Chechen conflict has  led to severe disruption of transport related to 
Russia's closure of  its borders to the Caucasus.  ·  ·  ·  . 
5.2 Turkey's role has SC? far been essentially limited'to its support of  Azerbaijan~ in particular the 
embargo on Armenia  1)  .  But its participation in the future development ·of the region ·will be a. 
vital  one.  It  borders  on  all  three  republics  and  dominates  the  communications  to  the 
Mediterranean and the West.  Turkey .has obtained from the Azeri govel'llffient an increased 
share in the Caspian offshore oil consortium,. and is orie of the countries interested 1n ensl;Jring  · 
the transit of  oil products through its territory.  Iran, having~  failed to join the consortium, is 
now siding with Russia's view on joint maritime jurisdiction over the Caspian Sea.  This would 
give either country an effective veto on offshoredevelopments .. Despite its ethnic and religious 
links  with Azerbaijan,  Irari  has  good  relatio.ns  with  ail  three  republics:  The  US has  been 
unwilling to supply aid to Azerbaijan.  It is assumed that this attitude owes much to lobbying 
by the Armenian diaspora, but is also linked to· US  policy towards Russian .involvement in the 
region.  However, now that. the US  has extensive economic interests - US .companies control 
51% of the Caspian consortium - the US  may become more  supportiv~  .ofthe peace process, 
espeeially  in  the  light  of the  Chechen  war and of differences  with  Russia  regarding  Iran.  · 
Washington· may also be expected to play a major role in decisions on the pipeline  ..  Another 
important  aspect  is  the  role  of the  Economic  Cooperation  Organisation  which  inctu'des 
Azerbaijan, Turkey: Pakistan, Iran and the Central Asian Republics: 
The EU's role to date  J 
6.  The Union's interests in the region may be examined under five main headings: 
Human rights and democracy:  The development  and consolidation of democracy and  the· 
respect of human rights constitute one of  the objectives of the Common FoJ;"eign· and Security 
policy of  the EU and are the basis for security and peace in the region.  Economic development 
and  the  construction of a  civil  society  which  observes  human  rights  and  the  fundamental 
freedoms are intrinsically linked. 
.  '  . 
Geopolitical I security:  The promotion of  regional stability is. important in.a part of  the world 
where, as is  noted above, Russia, Turkey and  Iran all have interests;  where they are already 
involved in a competition for influence;  and where. access to energy reserves in the Caspian 
Basin is proving to be a significant geopolitical faCtor. 
The EU has also an interest in cooperation given the importance of  organised crime links-in the 
republics.  ,·  · 
Humanitarian:  The sheer  volume  of human  sufferi~g in  this  region,  which  is  a  bridge 
between  Europe  and  Asia,  presents  the  EU  with .  a  moral  interest  m  participating  m 
humanitarian activity.  · 
l) Turkey's decision to open the air corridor to Armenia is a significant development. 
.  6 Economic:  The EU has economic interests particularly in Azerbaijan's energy sector.  As 
the Caspian offshore oil  fields  come  on stream  EU can  hope 'to  benefit both  through the · 
investments,· goods and services offered by EU companies, and as a major co~sumer.  There is 
however a risk of  ecological disaster if  the Caspian Sea oil exploitation would proceed without 
appropriate environmental guidance.  This environmental consideration· should be a scope of 
action for the EU.  The EU will need to ensure that it will play a key role in the negotiations of 
ooritracts for the exploitation of the. remaining huge  reserves;  in determining the routing of 
· pipelines;  and in ensuring that the outcome of  the debate on the maritime jurisdiction over the 
Caspian will not prevent the successful extraction of offshore oil.  This could be· assisted by 
improvement · of  existing  EC  relations  with  the . Economic  Cooperation  Organisation. 
Moreover,  when  the Customs  Union  with  Turkey comes  into  force,  Transcaucasia will  be 
directly adjaeent. 
Environmental:  The EU's interests concern above all the future of the Medzamor NPP,. in 
Armenia, and the risks attendant upon its recommissioning. 
7.  Bilateral relations to date' 
The  Union  has  sought,  hitherto ·to  maintain  an  even-handed  approach,  insofar  as  this  is 
possible.  It has accorded similar benefits, under the same instruments, to all three republics: 
Contractual 
Formal relations  are  still  based  upon the  1989 Trade and  Cooperation Agreement with  the 
USSR, which offers MFN treatment for  ~riffs and duties and establishes an institutionalised 
dialogue on all matters affecting the Agreement through Joint Committees.  Joint Committees 
were held with Georgia in December 1994 and with Armenia and Azerbaijan in March  1995. 
Exploratory discussions  on  a  possible future  agreement  were· held  concurrently.  · All  three 
republics have signed the European Energy Charter Treaty. 
Trade and investment 
These start from a very low base (see annex B) with the single exception ofthe consortium to 
develop the three Caspian sea oil fields.  The EC has undertaken to assist the three republics to 
maximise the opportunities offered by the Community's GSP. 
Humanitarian aid 
In  1994, the Commission provided emergency humanitarian aid to the three republics valued at 
54.55 MECU (up from  34 MECU in  1993).  This includes ECHO's share of the 204 MECU 
· food aid operation (see below).· This assistance is aimed at particularly disadvantaged groups, 
in particular refugees, internally displaced persons and victims of conflict (food parcels, baby 
and children's food, medical equipment, hygiene products, vaccines, shelters for refugees) and 
includes fuel aid in the form ofmazout (Georgia and Armenia). 
Food aid 
In  July  1994,  the  Commission,  acting  on  the basis of the  Council  Decision of that month, 
launched an  exceptional  operation to  supply  foodstuffs  valued at 204  MECU  to  tide  those 
republics facing the worst shortages of essential commodities over the winter of 1994-1995. 
The Transcaucasian republics' share of this operation is  137 MECU.  To date, deliveries have 
been almost completed, with registered losses of  less than 2%.  · 
'· 
7 Particular advantages .accrued from. the. choi~  .to  use the  Communit-y's  o~  resources  (4 
··  MECU, from Tacis) in order to fuiance ·a m6nitoring operation on the ground and so to control 
'directly both the transport and the distribution of  the food and the operation of  the: counterpart 
funds.  This could not have been achieved had the entire operation been.carried.out solely by 
non-governmental orgmiisations.  The results have been significant:  . 
•  very low losses;  . 
•  . indirect \SUpport to .the economy;  in Georgia, sales .  of EC  foodstuffs  provided much needed 
. backing for the currency and actually allowed ~e  Coupon to appreciate against the·rouble; . 
~  direct dialogue with the recipient govem.ffientS ai the highest level on the operation itSelf and on 
related matters, notably Operation Good Will;  · · ·  ·  · 
•  mudi greater visibility of  the EU in $e region; 
•  creation of  a climate of  confidence between the republics' leaders and the EU. 
,  ,  •  '·.  I  '  . 
TheCounterpart furids set up under the FE<lGA section of the  204 MECU operation' (165 
MECU out of  1) 204 MECU) are economically highly significant for the recipient countries. 
They represent a considerable proportion of the· total amount of loeal money in  Circulation 
(20%. in  Georgia)  and h3.ve  done  much  to .pro'vide  much  needed  backing for the currency, 
especially in Georgia and Armenia 2) . · The IMF has commented favourably on these results. 
Coordinatio~ with the US has been close throughout.  Building upon this positive e~perience, a 
joint EC-US mission has been.assessing food needs  forth~ coming winter.  . 
.  . 
In view of tqe shortage of  trains for transport of  foOd  aid, the Community, together with the 
Armenian and Azerbaijani government's,  launched "Operation Good Will" intended to release 
rolling stock which had been blocked due to the Nagorno~Karabakh war; and ·repair and' put 
into operation a part of  the railway communications in the. region.  In order to capitalise ori the  . 
progress achieved so far it is necessary tO address the underlying pcilitlcal problems (see para. 
12).  .  . .  . . 
· TechJJical assistance 
In the years 1991-1994, Tacis national allocations fo'r·the three republics runounted to around 
. 64 MECU -ofwhich 12.5 MECU in  1993 and again in'l994 (see schedule at Aimex C).  This 
amount  is  likely  to  be  increased  in  1995.  In  addition  they  benefit  from  the  Interstate 
programme and from. regional  programmes  in  the  fields .of telecomn1unications,  agriculture, 
energy,  environment and  enterprise  support.  Of particular  interest  to  the·  partners  is  the 
.. TRACECA  Programme  }'Vfuch  is desigried  to  encourng~ transport  li~s between  Europe, 
Caucasus and Central Asia.
1 
The Tacis Democracy Programme runs a: number of projects in 
the Transcaucasus (including six in Georgia). 
Financial assistance 
· ·Loans have been tal(en:iip by all three countries  under the 1250 MEC{J  facility ·decided ih 
1991  for the former Soviet Union (and allocated among the NISin 1992) 'intended to fmance 
imports of  food and medical products.  So far Armenia has borrowe.d 58 MECU and is on. time 
with its  interest payments,· but has  stated that'  it will  have difficult}'  in  repaying  principal. 
Azerbaijan  contracted  its  loan (68  MECU)  only  in  October  1994  arid  has  requested  an . 
extension of the drawing  periOd:  In  August  1995, Geargia is  due to .repay  70  MECU of 
principal; under present conditions, without new international support this country, which has 
no foreign exchange reser:v_es,  would~be unable to do so ..  In the same month Amtenia should 
' 
1>  Aid from the ECHO budget continues to be given as a grant to targeted recipients in the beneficiary . 
countries. 
2} Total amounts to be collected in the three republics exceed 27 MECU. · In Georgia they represent 45% 
of the State budget. 
8· repay 38 MECU and is likely to fu.ce similar difficulties.  A default by either country would 
have serious consequences for further EC non-humanitarian aid, and for their position vis-a-
vis external lenders. 
Political and diplomatic 
The EU has, in its statements on the conflict in Nagomo-Karabakh, underlined its support for 
the Minsk process and for the multinational peacekeeping force deeided at the OSCE Budapest 
Summit, and has  encouraged direct contacts between the parties; it has  also supported UN 
peacekeeping in the security zone on the Georgia-Abkhaz frontier and the political negotiations 
under OSCE!Russian mediation through the Joint Control Conunission for South Ossetia. 
· The  Conunis~ion delegate in Tbilisi presented his  credentials  on  12/12/1994.  Georgia' and 
Armenia have missions in Brussels and Azerbaijan intends to open one this year. 
8.  It follows from the above that the EU can expect to be involved in the region on a long term 
basis.  Indeed, it is already a major actor, with the capacity to shape the course of  events m  the 
reg1on: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
The EC and  the  Member  States are,  taken  together,  the  single  most  important donor,  and 
virtually the only bilateral donor in Azerbaijan, apart from Turkey; 
The United States is expected to reduce its future aid to the region significantly; 
New incentives are needed to deblock the current stalemate in the Minsk process; 
Given Russia's drive to dorninate the region militarily,· culminating in  its  basing agreements 
with Georgia and Armenia, many look to the EU as the only other actor capable of playing a 
major political role: 
However, the Union has not, as yet, capitalised on this to promote its political objectives.  The 
three republics are still in the early stages of a transition the first stage of which may last 3-5 
years, and will continue to require large scale humanitarian aid.  In the later stages the EU can 
'  be expected to assume the  role it has elsewhere in  the former Soviet Union - as  the region's 
principal Western trading partner and source of investment capital.  Thus the Union has, if it 
wishes  to  use  it,  the  ability  to  influence  :rranscaucasia's  development ·in  other  ways,  and 
actively help steer the three republics towards stable, democratic norms.  Moreover, given that 
their  future  depends  intimately  upon  the  resolution  of the  conflicts,  and  the  opening  of 
communications Within the region and between the region and its  neighbours, it may become 
difficult for the EC to amplify its  current role (essentially as an aid donor) while abstaining 
from political involvement.  Dialogue with Russia will have to be an important element in such 
involvement.  · 
Objectives of a coordinated strategy 
9.  In view of the EU's  interests  in  the  region,  a  strategy  aimed  at seeking  to  assist the  three 
.  republics to pass through what is  likely to be a lengthy transitional period, and eventually to 
· set the conditions .for sustained development,  is  required.  Given that the  EC does  not have 
additional  resources  which  could  be  diverted  to  this  purpose,  (unless  further  financial 
assistance canoe made available) this strategy Will  need to focus on deploying all instruments 
at our disposal in a coordinated way.  Itcould consist of  the following components: 
i)  political support for sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. 
Acceptance by aH  parties of the inviolability of borders, and the inadmissibility of the use of 
force to acquire territory, are essential elements in achieving regional stability. 
9 .... 
ii)  political dialogue on a bilateraVregionai basis.·  . 
· The objeqive is to use the means at the Union's disposal to promote- peace pr~sses  ·in the 
regional conflicts, especially Nagomo-Karabakh.  . 
.  •  .  .  •  •  • i  • 
iii)  support for the strengthening of  democratic institutions 
iv)  hum~tarian  atd including food and fuel aid 
v)  financial support.  . 
.  '  .  .  .  ' 
Exceptional support will be· needed in view of  the republics' dramatic economic situation and 
major balance of  payinents difficulties.  ·  ·  ·  .· ·  · J  ·  .  · 
. vi)  support for post~war recOnstruction 
·  promotion oftrade ~d  investment 
· technical assistance (institution building~ enterprise·  support~ restructuring of  agriculture, 
and energy sectors) 
promotion of  con1muriications links within the region and with other neighbours (in 
particular, pressure on Russia and Turkey to unblock transit to Armenia and Azerbaijan). 
vii) cooperation and coordination with other major donors 
Instruments 
lO .. Partne~ship and Cooperation Agreement (components i),  ii) and vi)). 
10 .I.  The Commission's October  1992  negotiating  mandate foresaw  virtually identical PC  As 
with·. all NIS:  The reasons for current hesitations to go ahead with the Caucasian republics 
were ()utlined  in  a  Commission  working paper communicated to  the Council· in  September 
1994.  1bis queried how realistic it is to expect full implementation of  the relatively high levels 
of obligations  inhere~t to  a  PCA;  by countries  which· were  facing  the difficulties  which · 
confront the Transcaucasian republics and which may have serious problems in satisfying the  . 
EC's conditionality.  :.  .  ·  ·  · 
10.2  · A number of variants could be put forward,  but in the final analysis these boil down to 
two principal options: 
The risk involved in the negotiation of  a PCA. is that it may· be a long time before its provisions 
can be properly implemented and, indeed, that partners may seek to suspend some of their 
obligations on grounds of national security ,or national emergency,  If  the EC were to conclude· 
10 international agreements, .knowing that its partners were unwilling or unable to comply ~th 
some of  its key provisions, other partners may well attach considerably less value to respect of 
those obligations.  ·  · 
•  A  less  am~itious  ,agree~ent could consist of trade, cooperation and investment provisions 
similar to those of  PCAs, but with a less ambitious preamble and without an institutionalised 
political dialogUe.  There could be an 
11evolution clause
11  allowing for the agreement to be 
eventually upgraded~ 
Such a 
11half-way, house"  would  have the advantage of recognising  current realities  in  the 
partner countries and so preserving the EU's international credibility.  It would also provide 
partners with an additional  incentive to put their house  in  order.  But it  would  convey  a 
negative political signal which-would certainly be resented by their governments, with possible 
~onsequences for the EU's future role in these countries, and could prove damaging to the 
interests of our economic operators.  Above  all,  it would exclude institutionalised  political 
dialogue, which would constitute the major vehicle by which the EU could influence future 
developments in these countries. 
10.3  Certain conclusions can be drawn: 
(a)  any form of agreement concluded by 'EC, whether or not a  full  PCA, will  be subject to 
human rights conditionality. 
(b)  A less ambitious agreement could offer no less than what already exists (in the 1989 EC-
. USSR Agreement),  and the trade and cooperation elements  in a  PCA are largely based on 
these.  The added  value  of a  PCA  is  rather  in  the  political  Statements  contained  in  the 
p~eamble, in  the. poiitical  dialogue,  and in  the  inyestrrient  - related  aspects.  There  is  no 
advantage to be gained in delaying an agreement on investment related matters, which is  in the 
interest of  EC economic operators as much as of  the NIS. 
(c)  Thus (given also partners' fear of being discriminated) the choice would appear to be not 
so much between a  PCA or another kind of agreement,  but between a  PCA now or a  PCA 
later. , 
10.4  Under these circumstances, the Commission considers that a further postponement of the 
NB: 
decision would serve little purpose and accordingly favours the opening of  negotiations with all 
three republics 1n the course of  this year. 
In the context ofPCA negotiations, it should be noted that the gap between NISi ambitions 
and their ability to realise these is particularly wide in the case of  Georgia and Armenia.  They 
have requested "Ukraine" style PCAs including the perspective of a free trade area.  But it is 
inconceivable that these countries could be ready for a free-trade agreement with the EU for a 
long time to come.  Were PCAs to be negotiated with them, a  non-binding "evolution clause
11 
might offer a way out.  No other modification in the 1992 mandate would appear justified at 
this stage.  Indeed, in view of  the uneven progress of the countries towards market economy, 
careful consideration will have to be given to the content of  the PCAs, in particular in the trade 
chapter. 
The PCAs could include provisions on cooperation in certain security-related areas, notably on 
illegal activities. 
11 .  I 
11. Enhanced  Diplo~atic  links 
(components i): ii) and vi))  .  .  . 
A .first step could be for the Commission's Delegation in Georgia to be accredited also to. the 
·other two  .r~publics.  Further Delegations should be established as soon as budgetary means 
permiJ:.  -
12. EU political role in the region 
(co~ponents i), ii) and iv)) 
. 12.1  Regarding Nagomo-Karabcikh in particular, it is possible, and desirable,  to add an EU · 
dimension to the work going on.in the OSCE and iJ:t  particular the Minsk Group.  The peace 
· process can be given a powerful boost through the introduction of  incentives to cooperate;  one 
way in which this can be achieved would be through the inclusion of  conditionality into future 
EC and Member State's assistance operatio'ns mounted .in  the context of this· str,ategy._  The 
EU's objectives would be to force the pace in achieving the tasks set out in the statement by the 
President of  the UN Security Council on 26 April 1995, i.e. the implementation of  confidence-
.·  building  measures,  including  repatriation of refugees  and  internally  displac~ per~ons, the' 
withdrawal  of forces,  the  convening of the  Minsk  Conference  and the  deployment  of the 
multinational OCSE peace-keeping force agreed at Budapest.  · 
It would  remain:. to be seen  whether  similar action  could  be .taken  in  the  rather  different 
Circums~nces pertaining in the Abkazia and South Ossetia conflicts. 
12.2  The EU also has a  role in  pers~ading Russia and Turkey to participate constructively. 
Particularly relevant would be the ~k  of obtaining support from Russia and Turkey for the 
reopening  of transit  routes  in  the  region  ~nd especially  to .· and . between  Armenia  and 
Azerbaijan. 
12.3  Part of  the dialogue with the ~epublics and with ne.ighbouring countries should be aimed at 
·promoting  the  EU's  interests  in  the  en'ergy  seetor~  concerning  both  the  extraction' of 
hydrocarbons· in the C~pian (including questions of maritime jurisdiction) and the routing of 
pipelines·.·  Questions of investment and transit may also be  rais~d.in the European J?nergy 
Charter Conference. 
12.4  The EU position should be expressed through political dialogue with -the  three  rep~blics 
themselves,  but also through  specific meetings  with Russia and Turkey on  the situation  in 
Transcaucasia.  Such  meetings  could  be. on  a  regional  basis  or  on a  bilateral  basis,  if · 
. appropriate~ 
/· 
12:5  Th_e  EU should  offer its  good offices,  to  promote  cooperat~on withi~ multilateral  fora 
(OSCE;  UN;  Partnership for Peace Programme) and possibly.withthe Council of  Europe  . 
13. Support (or democracy 
(component iii)). 
The  Community  has  'always  placed  the  support  of .democratic  development  among ·its 
priorities.  Similar objectives apply in  the case of other NIS, including the Trari.scaucasus. 
·.Measures should therefore include:  advice on _legislation;  practical assistance in establishing 
democratic  institutions;  and contacts  at various levels  between  European Parliamentarians, 
officials and non-governmental organisations and  counterparts in the republics..  The Tacis 
Democracy  Programme,  which  is  already  active  in  the  region,  could  complement  such 
activities.  The  monitoring  of the  elections  currently  foreseen  for  July. (Armenia)  August 
(Azerbaijan) and perhaps October (Georgia) 1995 should also be  a  part of the EU's overall 
st~ategy on democracy questions. 
12 14. Food aid, humanitarian aid, fuel and agricultural inputs 
(component iv)) 
Food aid  . 
14.1  In the light of  the results of  the joint ECIUS evaluation mission which was recently sent to 
the Caucasus and, subject to the availability of resources (both financial  and organisational) 
the EC should look into .the  possibility of launching a  substantial food aid operation on  a 
similar basis to the 1994 - 1995 campaign. 
Jlumanitarian aid, fuel and agricultural inputs 
· 14.2  Aid through  ECHO  is  expected  to  continue  on a  similar  basis  to  1994.  But neither 
ECHO's  resources  nor  food  aid  can  be  used  for  anything  like  a  sufficient  supply  of 
-.  commodities  which  are  desperately  needed  for  the  ongoing  reconstruction  of the  economy 
including fuel  and other agricultural inputs.  It is  essential that the  Council  Regulations  on 
structural food aid and food security1>  , which allow not just the supply of foodstuffs but the 
improvement of food security in general, (including the co-financing of certain inputs and the 
creation  of rapid  alert  systems  and  storage  capacities)  be  modified  so  as  to  cover  the 
Independent States.  Given the  limited  resources  available  - these  are intended to cover the 
whole developing world - it would in any event not be possible to provide by this means .food 
aid to the Transcaucasian republics on.the scale of  the current 204 MECU operation. 
The EC does  not  at present have  instruments,  other than  those  of ECHO,  to  supply  fuel. 
However, this is a problem sui generis to which resources need to be diverted (particularly in 
Georgia  and  Armenia).  If Member  States  are  willing  to  provide  bilateral  assistance,  the 
Commission may be able to help organise transport and monitoring.- Alternatively, it could be 
viewed as part of  the general balance of payments problem.  It has so been treated in the case 
of  other NIS outside the area. 
15.  Financial assistance (component v)) 
The  IMF,  which approved a  first  "systemic  transformation facility  (STF) tranche for  both 
Georgia and Armenia,  is  now aiming at the conclusion of stand-by arrangements before the 
summer of 1995.  As underlined by the IMF at the World Bank informal donors meeting on 
22nd  March  1995, .  owing  to  their  critical  economic  situation  and  balance  of payments 
difficulties neither Georgia nor Armenia would be able to implement ambitious adjustment a:nd 
reform programmes, and to remain current on their e>..1ernal  financial obligations without the 
highly concessional complementary support from the international community.  In the context 
of  the stand-by arrangements that Georgia and Armenia are expected to agree shortly with the 
IMF, the EC has been invited to demonstrate its solidarity and to provide its financial support 
to these countries at this critical juncture. 
Although the Community is not in a position to provide standard macro-financial assistance to 
these countries, the Commission. is expl6ring possibilities for exceptional financial support by 
other means, to be made available to Georgia and Armenia for humanitarian purposes.  The: 
Commission intends to put proposals to the Council shortly. 
16. Post-war reconstruction (component vi)) 
The EC does not have the means to enable it to participate actively in post-war reconstruction 
through major transfers of  resources.  But apart from the supply of  food aid and humanitarian 
assistance,  and  measures  to  assist  in  resolving  the  question  of outstanding  debts, ·it  can 
consider what more can be done in the context of  technical assistance . 
.  l) Reg. 3972/86 and 2507/88 and 2508/88 
13 ... 
The 1995 Tacis programmes are in the process of finalisati01,1,  in consultation with the .th:fee 
governments.  As  from -1996  there  will  be  a  new  Tacis  regulation  and a  new  indicative 
Programme.  Depending on political developments  and the needs  of the partners,  amounts 
available  for  allocation  to  national  programmes  could  determined,  and  the  content  of the 
programmes for 1996 and subsequent years oriented, towards some of the building blocks of 
post-war reconstruction, including:  'enterprise support and institution' building;  restructuring 
of energy and agricultural sectors;  and regional integration; including communications. links, 
(through TRACECA  1)  ,  as  appropriate)  and  teleconimunications.  Further  support  for· 
regional initiatives such as Black Sea Economic Cooperation could be considered. 
The  EU  could· use· its  resources  to  help  prepare  the  republics  for  mem~ership of other 
international fora, notably GA~/WfO. 
'  . 
The Community is  oppostxl on safety grounds. to Armenia's project to reopen  ~e  Medzamor 
nuclear power station, which is  located in a seismically unstable area.  Although Armenia has 
.  now  obtai~ed Russian assistance for this purpose, no measures. should be taken which might . 
encourage it to persist in this course. 
17. Cooperation with international donors (component vii)) 
Existmg cooperation with international  financing  institutions,  with EBRD and with the  US, 
Canada and Japan will  need to be intensified, so as to ensure satisfactory burden-sharing and· 
avoid duplication.  This-must be seen in the context of  the wider picture:  the US has chosen to 
support Georgia .and  Armenia,  but the EC  (together with Turkey)  has  so far. been the only 
important 'western donor, othenhan the IFis, in Azerbaijan's case.  Cooperation is also needed 
with NIS creditors (in particular Russia and Turkmenistan). 
*  *  * 
Conclusions: 
18  a)  The EC can build upon its existing instruments to establish a credible strategy towards the 
three republics.  This strategy can be ·based upon the negotiation, of  a PCA with each republic, 
but this  must be  supplemented  by measures  intended to ensure the physical.survival 'of the 
population (food and pumanitarian aid) and technical a.Ssistance  for post-war reconstruction. 
Exceptional fmancial  assistance is  an option to be· considered in the cbntext of the  expected  .· 
IMF s~d  by agreements (Georgia and Armenia).  -
b)  Ari overall  ~trategy of this kind would be virtually unprecedented in terms of both scope and 
content  If implemented it would undoubtedly represent a major factor in the thr~  republics~ 
future development and would give the Union  very  substantial leverage in the pursuit of its 
objectives.  It  would  also  serve  the  EU's  interests  in  various  areas,  i.e.  human  nghts, 
geopolitical,. humanitarian, economic and environmentaL  Accordingly, the Union should link · 
its implementation to progress in meeting those objectives:· acceptance by'all parties of  each of 
the republics' sovereigntY,  independence and territorial integ'rity;.  the resolution of conflicts; 
the  promotion  of .  politica.l  reform~ · especially  as  regards  humari  rights  and  democratic 
institutions;  the  repatriation of refugees;  and  progress  on  economic  reform,  all  essential . 
·elements iri achieving regional stability. 
c)  kmore active political dialogue with the partners and with Russia arid Turkey can support the 
reconstruction process. 
l) TRACECA:  Transport Corridor- Europe- Caucasus- Asia.  Commission initiative support~~ through 
Tacis. 
14 d)  It is •  important to continue with as even-handed an approach as possible between the ·three 
republics in applying these  instruments.  However,. in Azerbaijan's  case the circumstances 
·regarding financial assistance differ from those of  Georgia and Armenia. 
19. A  number  of components  of the  coordinated  strategy  (notably  in  the  field  of political 
cooperation, support for democratic institutions and possibly some fields of assistance) could 
be the object of  a Conunon Position.  · 
A checklist of  the instruments referred to in paragraphs 10 - 17 is attached at Annex D. 
15 Draft Common Position 
on ~e  objectives and. priorities of  the EuropeanUnion 
towards the Transcaucasian Republics 
The Commission, in  fo~ard~ng  to the Council aCommmiication ~n  the totality of  the European·. 
Union's relations with the Transcaucasian Republics, considers it necessary, in parailel, to propose-
tl~at the Council adopt a Common Position by virtue of  Article J.2 of  the T.reaty on European 
Union  · 
I 
/ 
16 COMMON POSITION 
of 
defined by the Council on the basis of  Article J.2 of the Treaty on European Union 
on the objectives and priorities of the European Union towards Armenia, 
Azerbaijan and Georgia 
(95/  .. ./CFSP) 
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 
Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 1.2. thereof, 
SETS OUT THIS COMMON POSITION: 
A. The European Union will  pursue the following objectives and priorities in its relations 
with the Republics of  Annenia, Azerbaijan arid Georgia : 
I.  to  support  the  Republics'  independence,  sovereignty  and  territorial  integrity,  while 
contributing to the permanent resolution of  the conflicts in the region; 
2.  with  this  end  in  mind,  to  institute  dialogue  with  the  three  Republics,  and  with 
neighbourin'g  countries,  with  a  view  to  the  achievement  of permanent  political 
settlements, the repatriation of refugees and the reopening of communications in  the 
Transcaucasus ; this in support of,  and in  close coordi':lation with the work of  the UN 
and  OSCE.  Regarding  Nagorno-Karabagh,  a  European  Union  dimension  could  be. 
added the peace-process going on within  OSCE and  in  particular the Minsk Group, 
bearing in mind the incentives to improved cooperation in the region; 
3.  to support initiatives  aimed  at fostering  cooperation and  mutual  confidence between 
the countries in the region; 
4.  to  support  the  further  development  of  democratic  norms  and  institutions,  the 
promotion of  human rights and individual liberties and the rule of  law within the three 
Republics, as well as the monitoring of electoral processes.  In this respect,  advice on 
legislation  and  practical  assistance  in  establishing  democratic  institutions  through 
contacts  between  officials,  parliamentarians  and  non-governmental  organisations, 
through Community and Member States' programmes, will be pursued. 
5.  to underline the importance of the European Community's role as a major provider of 
assistance to the three Republics,  in  order to  promote the above  objectives and  the 
process of  political and economic reform generally. 
6.  to  take  steps  to  assist  the  three  Republics  to  pass  through  the  difficult  period  of 
transition and  eventually  to  help  set  the  conditions for  their  sustained  development, 
once the conflicts in  the region have been  resolved.  This shall  be  done through inter 
alia: 
17 - supporting fefforts  to consolidate· economic reform,  based upon agreements with. the . 
IMF arid other international financing  in~titutions~  · 
- cooperating as  Closely .as  possible  with  those  institutions,  other donors  and  other 
Independent States which are creditors of  the three Republics~ 
providing humanitarian assistance, including the supply of  es~ential foodstuffs and 
fuel,  whefe this  is  deemed  necessary,  in  addition to Community operations  in· these 
areas, 
..  .  . 
7.  to  support_ equable · solutions  regarding  access_ to,  and  transit  for  export of,  energy 
products~ 
s:  to include in the European Uriion's political dialogue with the three Republics security-
related areas of  mutual interest, inc hiding combating illegal  activities~  · 
9. to promote:  cooperation within multilateral fora,  including the UN, the OSCE and the 
Energy Charter Conference; the development of Partnership· for Peace programmes ; 
and, as appropriate, cooperation between the Republics and the Council of  Europe. 
B. Member  ·states  shall  ensure  that their  national  policies  conform  to  this  common 
position. 
THE_·  COUNCIL  NOTES  that  the  Community,  on  -the  basis  of the  Commis'sion's 
r  .  . 
. initiatives,  will  contribute  to  the  above  in  particular .. through  the  negotiation  and 
implementation of Partnership and Cooperation Agreements and through implementation 
of  the European Energy_Charter Treaty. 
THE COUNCIL Wll..L  UNDERTAKE  the  necessary  measures  to promote the above 
·. mentioned  objectives  ·and  ·priorities,  where  appropriate  on  the  basis  ·of Commission 
proposals. 
\ 
C. This  common po_sition shall be published in the Official Journal. 
Done at Brussels, 
For the Council, 
The President, 
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AnnexA II-F-3 
ARMENIA 
Background note on the economic situation 
General background.·  . .  .  .  . 
. The Armenian economy has been living under severe ·shock circumstances since the 1988., 
earthquake and  the dissolution of the USSR in  1991.  The-earthquake destroyed  about 
40% of the country's manufacturing capacity;· about half a million people out of a total 
population pf.3.  7 million became homeless, Within· the FSU, the country's economy was 
very  dependent on trade with other republics,. which  collapsed after the dissolution of . 
Union. This was aggravated by war with Azerbaijan and the blockade to which Armenia, a· 
landlocked  country,  was submitted,  which  had  a  severe  impact as  Armenia's  principle 
transit route for energy 
1and other ·goods had  traditionally been.  Az~rbaijan; As a result, 
industrial production and  living  standards fell  sharply.  GDP- fell  by  abo~t 70% between· 
1991  and 1993.  Statistical  indications  show .that,  except  for  agriculture,  th~  , drop  of 
production was even sharper in  other sectors such as  construction, transport and ·trade 
services.  Real revenues fell  sharply,  with wages reaching a level  of 4-5 ..  $ per month  i~ 
1994.  .  I 
The need for stabilisation  .. 
Prices-·incre(lSed  100%  in. 1991  and  were  multiplied  by  eight  in  1992.  In 1993,. 
hyp~rinflationnary levels were reached with monthly inflation  levels  of an  average 26% 
over thi:dirst 10 months. A new national currency, the· dram, was introduced in November 
1993. However, in the absence ofa stabilisation policy,  inflation rose further in the first 
months  which ' followed  the  introduction  of the  dram.  In  early  1994  the  authorities. 
tightened  their  .  public  expenditure  and  monetary . policies.  . As  a . result,  inflation 
considerably_declined from an estimated 50% in January to 4% in August 1994; however, 
inflationary pressures resumed at the end of.1994.' 
The main reason for past inflation has been the disequilibryum of  public finance.  The·.state 
budget was under strain in. an economy of  war, with defence spending amounting 11% of 
GDP i'fl  1993. Subsidies were high (still 20% of.GDP in 1994), particularly for basic food. 
· Furthermore,. in the context of the payments crisis  in ·.1993  the state increased its direct 
coricessionallending to state enterprises through the budget. On the other hand; the fiscal 
basis had become extremely fragile. Tax revenue f~ll from 21% of  GDP iri 1992 to 15% of· 
GDP in 1994. As a result, the budget deficit rose to 70% of  GDP in  1993  and about 46% 
in  1994 (without taking into account humanitarian grants  on  which· the country .heavily 
relies, worth 23% of  GDP in 1994).  -
·structural reform. 
One of  the main areas of concern is the inadequacy of social safety measures, most of  the 
financial  support by the state being channelled:through price subsidies  .. The high  leveL of 
social spending is, poorly targeted, The authorities are conscious ofthis situation and have 
requested external  support to prepare building  up  a new social  safety  net.  Privatisation 
. started in  1991  with  agriculture.  A law  on  privatisation  was  approved  in  1992,  and  a 
privatisation  programme  passed  ·in  1994,  representing  about  35%  of  state~owned 
productive assets.  Most of the legal  framework of a market  economy is now in  place. · 
Laws regulating the Central Bank activity  and  the· financial  sector have been  adopted. 
20 Central bank refinancing is  allocated through auctions since  1993  and  banks have  been 
requested to improve their capital base.  Much remains however to be done to suppress· 
government intervention  in  the  allocation  of credit  and  to improve  the  solidity of the 
banking sector burdened with bad loans.  . 
Recent developments. 
In early 1994 the authorities began to tighten their expenditure:  subsidies to enterprises 
were  reduced,  as  well  as  lending  on the  budget.  Public  expenditure  were  limited ·  and 
revenue  collection  improved.  The ·  need  for  monetary  refinance  of the.  budget  thus 
declined,  and  monetary growth was lower.  The output decline seems to have .ceased  in 
1994,  with  an  estimated  GDP growth of 4  percent over the year. This remains  to be 
confirmed, as the austerity measures on government spending and lending may still have a 
strong recessionary impact over the forthcoming period. 
In  Autumn  1994 the  authorities  approved  a  programme of enhanced  stabilisation  and 
reform  measures  over  15  months,  including  a  progressive  phasing  out  of customer 
subsidies,  the  hardening  of budget  constraints for ·state  enterprises,  improving  the  tax 
collection, raising interest rates and further progress of privatisation. This programme was 
supported by  the IMF by  an  SDR  16.9  million  (about US  dollar  25  million)  "systemic 
transformation facility"  which was approved. in December and is  expected to be followed 
~y a stand-by arrangement in June 1995. 
The external situation. The need for international support in 1995. 
The country's external situation is very fragile .. Armenia,  which had no  foreign exchange 
reserves when it became independent in  1992, has experienced growing trade and  current . 
account deficits (US  dollar  190  million  in  1993  and  US  dollar 240 million  in  1994).  In 
1993  and  1994, the  capitaf account  mainly  reflected  external support given· by  the EU, 
Russia and other bilateral donors.  The current account deficit is expected to amount US 
dollar 355 million in  1995, according to the latest IMF estimates. Together with the need 
for an increase in reserves, the country's external financing requirement would reach some 
US$  465  million  in  1995.  After  possible  disbursements  from  the  international  financial 
institutions worth US$ 200  million (including further IMF  support in  the context of the 
expected forthcoming stand-by arrangement and US$ 80 million World Bank concessional 
.loans), the residual financing gap would amount to US$ 265  million and,  considering the 
country's dire economic situation, would have to be financed by concessional finance· and 
humanitarian assistance from bilateral donors. 
.  j 
21 II-F-3' 
AZERBAiJAN. 
Background note on the economic situation. 
General background  .  .  . 
The dissolution of  the FSU at the end of 1991  and war in Nagomo·Karabakh since 1992 
which led to. hundreds· of thousands· refugees have dramatically affected Azerbaijan over 
the .  past few years.  This  was further aggravated by other regional conflicts in  Abldlatia · 
and, 'more  recently,  Chechnya,  which  disrupted  the  northern  commercial ·routes,  and ... 
. recent' civil unrest in the country.  As  a.r~sult output dropped, QDP is  estimated to have · 
fallen by 20% in  f993 ·and again in  1.994.  Average individual revenues' declined by about 
60% since  1992  ~own to a level  of 9 US  dollars per month by the end  of 1994.  The 
country,  which would  have  a strong iQdustrial  potential based  on the oil  industry,  and 
could be qne of  the most wealthy NIS, is thus in a dire economic situation.  . 
Macroeconomic stabilisation 
A  large  public  budget  deficit  (worth  13%. of GDP  in  '1994}  financed  by  uncontrolled 
monetary expansion (900% in 1994) have led over the recent period to hyperinflation and 
large  economic imbalances.  Inflation,  which.· after  Spring  1994  slowed  down· to 6%  in 
August owing to the government's efforts to  control  public expenditure resumed  at the 
end of 1994 to over 50% per month in November and December after subsidies had been 
substantially increased. General lack offinancial discipline led to growing inter-enterprises 
· arrears.  The  lack  of confidence  in  the  local  currency  triggered a  growing  flow  of 
transactions  in  dollars,  fuelled  by  a  remaining  substantial  inflow  of foreign  exchange 
earned on cotton and energy exports.  In 1994 total hard currency deposits reached 50% 
of the broad. money.  Also  the government became more  dependant on. hard  currencies 
revenues. The surrender requirement on foreign exchange earnings reached 65  to 70% of 
the  most  important  exported  goods, ·and  amounted  to  almost  50%  of government 
revenues. 
In  early  1995  the  authorities  adopted  a  comprehensive  programme  of ·stabilisation 
measures which was supported by the IMF.  The main  target of the programme was to 
requce inflation down to 5% per month by· mld-1995 and 2%.·per month at the end of  the 
year.  To achieve this,  a tight monetary ·policy  is being .implemented.  The central bank 
refinancing rate, which was still negative in real terms by the end of 1994 has already been 
raised. Credit auctions were introduced in March. A new c(mtrai bank law is to be enacted . 
by the. middle of 1995.  A'GDP 2% ceiling  has· been .introduced for  bank credits to the 
government.  The  target  for  the  budget  deficit  has  been  set  at  5%  of GDP.  Public 
expenditure  shiill  be  cut,  which  will  be  all  the  more  necessary  to  compensate  for ·the · 
decision to abolish the surrender requirement.  · 
Structural change 
Prices have already been liberated except for  bread,  energy,  housing and  public utilities 
goods and services, which are highly subsidised ..  T<ble tfun of the new 1995 programme is · 
to completely phase out price subsidies  except for natural monopolies.  The state order 
system is being dismantled, and external trade liberalised, but a temporary tax on exports 
shall  apply  in  order  to  partly  compensate  for  the  loss  of revenue  on· the  abolished 
22 surrender requirement. The phasing out subsidies is to be compensated by the introduction 
of  a social safety net for the most. vulnerable groups. 
Privatisation, which had been slow until  1994, shall be accelerated. A quick privatisation 
scheme for  SMEs is  to .be  implemented,  while  a  mass  privatisation programme should 
ensure the privatisation of  large enterprises, after prior steps such as the distribution of 
vouchers and the corporatisation of  large enterprises have been implemented. 
The external account. 
The current account was already in  deficit in  1993  (US  dollar  37  million);  this  deficit 
aggravated in  1994 (US  dollar  179  million,  i.e.  15%  of GDP).  For the latter year,  this 
· deficit  was ·mainly  financed  by  Turkish  Exim  bank  credits,  modest  foreign  direct 
investment flows and substantial payment arrears vis-a-Vis Turkmenistan. The outlook for 
1995  is  a  current  deficit  over US  dollar  200  million  (IMF  estimate).  On  the  capital 
account side, repayments in  1995 on loans from Russia and Turkey shall be compensated 
by  the release of part the ECU 68  million  EU commercial  credit for food  and  medical 
imports which was  made  available_ in  1992  but on  which  drawings  by  Azerbaijan  only 
started in  19 94. 
In April  1995 the IMF approved the disbursement of  a first STF tranche· of  the equivalent 
of 44 million US  dollars in  support of the government programme, to be followed  by  a 
similar second tranche by the end of the year.  This, together with credits from the World 
Bank (worth US  dollar  37 million)  and  an  expected  rescheduling  of arrears  owed  to 
Turkmenistan should pro~ide the bulk of  the financing of  the current account deficit. 
A consortium of  major international oil companies recently signed an agreement with the 
authorities on the development of  the Caspian offshore fields.  This should allow for short 
term inflows of investments and future revenues on oil exports.  While,  on the long term, 
this will contribute to consolidate the balance of payments, on the short-medium term the 
country's external situation will.remain constrained. 
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·GEORGIA. 
Background note on the· economic situation.:  . 
General background and recent developments. 
Faced with a war in Abkhazia and disruptions which followed the dissolution of  the FSU, 
the. Georgian  econOJllY  suffered  severe  drops  of output.  War·  led  to  disruptions  in 
transport and production; about 200 000 to 300 000 refugees fled from Abkhazia to other 
regions. The. trade shock following the dissolution of the FSU was severe,· as 96% of  the 
country's exports had  been going 'to the FSU until  1990:  T~s led  to .a sharp decline  in 
output, hyper-inflation, a deterioration of  the fiscal revenues and a growing external debt. 
:Between 1990 arid  1994, the cumulative economic decline is estimated to about so% of 
GNP and  GNP, per capita has fallen to us$ 563 in  1993, compared with US$ 2,336 for 
Russia.  -
.  '·  .  .  .  .  ·'  ·. 
The signature of  a cooperation treaty with Russia in February 19941ed to some progress 
towards  stability.  Nonetheless,  the  situati~n  remains  critical.  The  output  decline 
· continued, the average monthly rate of inflation was around 6% and tax revenUes,  below 
. 2% of GOP,  dramatically  insuffici~nt to cover basic needs.  Households continued to rely  . 
~·  . on extetnal_humanitarian assistance and'informal sectcir activities resources to cover their  • 
basic needs.  .  .) 
Macroe~onomic  stabilisation 
In Autumn i 994, in order to achieve macroeconomic stability the government prepared in 
-close cooperation with the Fund a programme which  entails a drastic fiscal a~justment 
followed  by  a  strict  monetary  policy.  An  agreement  with  the  IMF  on  detailed  policy 
measures  was  reached  in  December .1994 and .the  Fund  subseq1,1ently  allocated  a  first 
Systemic  Transformation  Facility  (STF)  tranche.  The  programme· aims  at  bringing 
· inflation from  hyper  inflationa~ levels (  60% per month in early· 1994) down to 1%  per. 
month by the end of 1995, and to stabilise the temporary currency, the coupon  .. 
'The ceqtrepiece of the government's strategy is  the reduction of the budget deficit to 6-
7% of ODP  iri. i 995  mainly through phasing out subsidies on bread,  electricity,. gas and 
public transport.  The implementation of a taX  package (including  increase  in  the. VAT · 
rate,  suppression  of VAT  exemption,  increase  of excise  an~. customs  ~axes). should 
. contribute to the reduction of  fiscal imbalances. Consistent with the inflation objective, the 
monetary  part  of the  programme  aims  at  tightening  the  budgetary  constraint  on  the 
enterprises  ~nd the state. Direct credits to state-owned l;>anks from the central bank. have 
been  suppressed.  New central  bank credits to banks  are  allocated  through auctions.  A · 
20~  reserve requirement on domestic credits has aJready b~en introduced for banks. · 
.  '  . 
The government has  urufied  the exchange rate for both cash and  non-cash trading ..  Th~ 
tightening' of  the monetary policy which. already led to an appreciation ofthe coupon vis-
a-vis the rouble is  also intended to prepare for the introduction .of the new money;  "the 
Lari", in the middle of 1995.  By the end  of 1994 foreign  cur~ency deposits represented 
60% of  all deposits.  · 
24 Structural reform. 
Prices have been liberalised in Georgia, but bread, medicine and energy remained highly 
subsidised until  1994. In September, it was decided to charge formerly subsidised goods 
at cost covering prices. By the end of 1994, budget transfers to state owned enterprises 
were phased out. Major reforms remain however to be implemented. The social transfers, 
which up to 1994 went through subsidised prices, are inadequate for the most vulnerable 
groups. A modem social security system has to be build and the financial  sector has also 
to be reformed and strengthened.  · 
Privatisation is almost complete for housing. By the end of 1994 about 3  8% of  arable land 
had been privatised. In spite of the immediate focus on macroeconomic stabilisation, the 
government programme also accelerates structural reforms. This includes the total phasing 
out of subsidies to enterprises, the settlement of inter-enterprises arrears in  1995 and the· 
dismantling  the remaining  state orders  system.  Privatisation  of· small  scale  enterprises, 
which  already took place fairly  rapidly,  should  be  completed  by  auctions.  Large  scale 
enterprises  privatisation,  which. had  not  started  before  the  end  of  1994,  will  be 
implemented.  This  will  start with  the  corporatisation  of state-owned  enterprises,  thus 
providing  a  stream  of enterprises  for  the  mass  privatisation  programme  for  which 
vouchers  will  be  distributed.  A  regulation  on  investment  funds  shall  be  enacted.  The 
restructuring of the government  should  involve  a  substantial  reduction  in  size  (at least 
25%) and a functional re-organisation of  the government's current structure. 
The external account. The need for international support. 
In 1993 the current account deficit reached 28% of  GDP, at a level of  US$ 190 million~ In 
1994, despite a further contraction of trade,  the deficit  reached  about US$  490 million 
(excluding official transfers). This deficit was mainly financed by EU and US humanitarian 
grants.  Georgia faces a heavy external debt service burden,  and  has accumulated arrears 
on  gas  imports  from  Turkmenistan  and  also  on  serv1cmg  existing  externai  financial 
obligations. 
Despite a further contraction of imports,  the IMF expects the current account deficit to 
remain high in  1995 at about US  $ 390 million.  On the capital account side;  amortisation 
payments are expected to ,rise sharply, including total ECU 75  million  maturities  on the 
EU commercial credits. The IMF estimates the gross financing requirement to US$ 1050 
million for the year. After IMF and World Bank disburserpents, the residual finanCing gap 
would  reach  some  US$  900  million  for  the  programme  period.  Despite  an  expected 
rescheduling agreement with Turkmenistan on the energy supplies ·arrears, which could be 
worth US$ 450 million, the remaining financing gap  is  considerable and will mainly_.have· 
to  be  filled  by  means  of complementary  financing  and ·humanitarian  assistance  from· 
bilateral donors. 
25 Trade between the EU and the Caucasian countries 
. (in mecu).· 
--- ' 
(*)  1st sem.  2nd sem.  lst sem  ..  1993 
!  1993  1993  1994 
. -
Georgia  I  26.9  11.4  8.8  38.3 
E  45.1  38.9  51.2  84.0 
B  + 18.2  + 27.5  +42.4  +45.7 
Arnienia ·  'I  . 4.8  11.0  12.1  15.8 
:  E  . 21.0  29.9  :.  ··.  16.0  ..  50.9 
»  + 16.2  + 18.9  +3.9  :  + 35.1 
Azerbaijan 
c 
I  20.9  18.0  .7.4  38.9 
R  28.7  24.6  28.9  53,3 
B  + 7.8  +6.6  + 21.5  +14.4 
' 
..  ----
Caucasian  I  52.6  40.4  28.3  93.0 
countries  E  94.8  ' 93.4  96.1  188.2 
B  +42.2  + 53.0  + 67.8  + 95.2 
-·  ....... 
I : EU Imports - E : EU Exports - B : EU Balance 
1)  Of  which 93% arc pearls, precious stones and ~etals,jewellery, ... (CCTXIV). 
2)  0,3% of total EU imports from the 12 NIS. 
3)  1,3% of  total EU exports to the 12 NIS. 
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"1994 
·10 months 
13.9  (- 61%) 
70.7.  ( ~  9%) 
+'56.8  . 
·.24.91(+116o/o) 
.. ·.  37.2  (- 16%) 
+ 12.3 
'· 
16.2  (-51%) 
54.6 (+22%) 
.+38.4. 
. 55.0 (-32%)T 
162.5 (- 3%)3 
+ 107.5 AnnexC 
CURRENT TACIS·ACTIVITIES IN TRANSCAUCASIA 
27 TACIS PROJEcrs CURREN'I'LY BEING IMP!.EM:EN·t·~ru 
.  ' 
IN  ARMENIA 
A total of  over 21-Million ECU (1991-1993) 
1.  ENERGY (focal &ector)- tota15,3 MECU 
•  Technical Assistance to a project of  implantation of  two mini-hydroplants 
0,2 MECU (1991) 
•  Energy Centre 
0,5 :MECU {1991) 
•  ·Evaluation of  Armema•s potential of  hydrocarbon: deposits. 
o,s ~cu  (1992) 
•  Extension and  Strengthecing of  the Energy Saving Strategy Programme·  . 
1,1 MECU (1992) 
•  Technical support for the development of  the gas industry (under.J>reparation) · 
1,9 MECU (1993) 
•  Extension and strengthening of  the Energy Centre (lfnder preparation) 
.  ·~: 
.  .  -1,1 MECU (1993) 
2.  PRIV  ATISATION - total2,17 :MECU 
;  . 
! 
•  Technical  Assistance  for  Implementation  of an  overall  Privatisation  Strategy. in' 
Armenia·. 
0,97 MECU (1992) 
•  Management and Services adv1ce facility 
1,2 MECU (1993) 
3.  F'INANCIAL SERVICES  -. totai1,65 M:Ecu 
•  Armenian Agriculture Cooperation Barile 
0;75 MECU (1991/92) 
•  T echnic;:d Assistance to mutual and Investment funds 
0,9 MECU (1993) 
4.  SMALL AND :MEDIUM ENTERPRISES  - totall,3 MECU 
•  · SME Development Age~cyY  erevan  · 
0,8 MECU (1992) ~  Business Communication Centre. 
.  0,5 MECU. (1992) . 
5.  TRANSPORT - totall,O MECU 
•  ~vernment  Advice to the Railway Department. 
0,5 MECU (1992) 
•  Urban passenger transport 
0,25 :MECU (1992)  . 
•  Y ervevan metro leakage project 
0,25 MECU (1992) 
6.  FOOD AND AGRICUL  TRURE  - total1,8 MECU 
·•  Agricultural and Irrigation Extension and Farmer Services Project 
1,8 MECU (1992) 
7.  HUMAN RESOURCE DEVELOP.MENT  - total 3,4 M.ECU 
•  Reform and Strengthening of  the Public Administration 
.1,5 MECU (1993) 
•  Reform of the Social  Security  SyStem  and  Strengthening  of the  Social  Security 
Services 
1,9 MECU.(l993) 
8.  Armenia has also benefited or will benefit from a number of  projects under the 1991, 
1992,. 1993  and  1994  Regional  (Interstate)  Programmes,  amongst  which  the 
TRACECA programme. 
9.  As regards the 1995 Tacis Programme, projects have been identified for a total of 5,5 
rvfECU (+ 0,5 MECU reserve) in the following sectors: 
-ENERGY (focal sector) 
. -·ENTERPRISE RESTRUCTURING AND DEVELOPMENT 
-HUMAN  RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT 
29 TACIS PROJECTS CURRENTLY BEING IMPLEMENTED IN  .AzERBAIJANr 
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. - a total of  over 21 million ECU 
1.  ENERGY-TOTAL 5.1 ~CU 
•  Advice to SOCAR, Azenergy:. 1.5 lviECU(1992). 
•  Development ofthe oil equipment industry- 2lviECU (1993). (Under tender) · 
• ·  Improvement of  consumer ser,vice iii gas and electricity utilities- 1.6 MECU{1993). 
(Under  tend~r)  ·  ·  ·  · 
·2.  ENTERPRISE RESTRlJC.WR.ING AND DEVELOPMENT-TOTAL 4.6 MECU , 
•  . Training for cOmmercial banking- 0~6 MECU (1992). 
•  Assistance .to the Privatisation agency- 1.5 MECU {1992). 
•  . Establishment of  a SME develqpment agency- 0.6 MECU (1992). 
•  Management advice and services facility for entecprises- L2 MECU (1993): 
•  TutQring programme for sm~l and medium enterprises-o.7MECU (1993)  ... 
. 3.  HUMANRESOURCESDEVELOPMENT-TOTA;L4.8 MECU 
•  Strengthening of  public administration- 3 lviECU (1992}. 
•  Strengthening of  management training- 1.3 :MECU (1993). (Under:tender) 
•  Development of  employment services- 0.5 :MECU {1993}. (Under,preparation) 
I  . 
4. ·  TRANSPORT AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS- TOTAL'(+/- 4  MECU)  · 
•  Government  advice  to  the  Ministry  of Communications  - 2.3  MECU  (1992). 
(Vario~~:transport projects under tender)  · 
I 
5.  FOOD PRODUC..'TION, PROCESSING AND DISTRIBtmON- TOTAL 3.0 MECU 
•  Institutiol?al Support to the Ministry of  Agriculture'- 0.6 MECU (1992). 
•  ASsistance to privatefatnily faims- 0.9 :MECU (1992).  · 
•  Privatisation offood distribution sector.; 1.5 M£CU {1992). 
.  . 
6.  Azerbaij  ari  has  also benefited· or will  benefit from· a number of projects under the· 
1991-1995 Regional {rnTER-STATE) Prograriunes.  · · 
·1  ..  The programming mission for the 1995 Action Programme took place in March and 
·  resulted i~ the identification  ~fprojects'to the value of a further 6 million ECU in 
the  following  priority  sectors:  Energy:  Enterprise· restructuring  and  development~  ,. 
and Human resources development 
1 ( 1992 I 3 ) = date of  Action Programme TACIS PROJECfS CuRRENTLY BEING IMPLEMENTED 
IN GEORGIA 
A total of  over 23 Million ECU (1992-1994) 
1 -GOVERNMENT ADVICE-total2,75 MECU 
National Goverrunent Strengthening 
"Government Advice" 
· Employment Services" 
Development of  the Tbilisi Airport 
Development of  an Energy Policy 
TOTAL 
934.800 
499.900 
312.331 
250.000 
700.000 
2.- SUPPORT FOR ENTERPRISES- total 7,1 MECU 
Bank Training Restructuring 
SME Development Agency + Business 
Communications Centre 
1993/94 Programme S:ME Development 
Privatisation strategy 
Enterprise Policy Guidelines 
TOTAL 
600.000 
1.700.019  ' 
1.800.000 
1.199.900 
1.800.000 
3. - HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT -total3,05 :MECU 
a) Management Training 
b) Employment Services 
c) Bank Training and Restructuring 
d) Civil Service Reform & Training 
TOTAL 
954.092 
115.933 
288.565 
1.800.000 
4.- FOOD PRODUCTION & DISTRIBUTION- total 3,3 MECU 
T A to the Georgian Agriculture 
T A to the Georgian Agriculture 
TOTAL 
1.500.000 
1.800.000 
(1992) 
{1992) 
(1992) 
(1992) 
(1992) 
2.697.031 
(1992) 
(1992) 
(1994) 
(1992) 
(1994) 
7.099.919 
(1992) 
(1922) 
(1992) 
(1994) 
3.158.590 
(1992) 
(1994) 
3.300.000 5 -BUMANITARIAN A.ID- total6 MECU 
I~pection  Serv. Fuel Oil 
Oil· Energy  ·supply 
Humanitarian Aid Georgia 
327.267 
~  5.580.267 
28:296. 
TOTAL 
(1993) 
.(199~) 
(1993) 
. 5.935.830 
. 6. MONITORING AND EVALUATION+ ,RESERVE-tottal 0,8 :MECU 
·Food Aid Morutoring 
Energy Policy Development 
M&E,Kiev, West and SW Core Team 
TOTAL· 
... 
.  400.000 
'200.000 
200;000 
.TOTAL 
(1+2+3+4+5+6) 
(1994) 
(1994) 
(1994) 
800.000 
. 22.991.370 
.  ~ AnnexD 
Checklist of instruments 
For strategy components i), ii) and vi) 
•  Dialogue with the republics onconflict-related issues, including conditionality regarding future 
EU assistance; 
•  ad  hoc  meetings  (until  PCA  in  place)  of  Troika  political  directors  with  CauCasian 
counterparts, possibly on a regional basis; 
•  Framework agreement (PCA) to be negotiated shortly; 
•  Establishment/accreditation ofEU  delegation(s); 
•  Cooperation ,...;th multilateral organisations (OSCE;  UN;  NATO/P4P;  Council ofEurope), 
•  Political  dialogue  with  Russia  and  Turkey  with  a  view  to  reopen  transit to  Armenia  and 
Azerbaijan; 
•  Dialogue on energy-related matters (extraction;  pipeline routes;  maritime jurisdiction) 
For component iii) 
•  Support for democratic institutions;  Parliamentary contacts;  monitoring of  elections. 
For component iv) 
•  FOod  aid  (through  similar mechanism  as  1994-5)  - depending  on  findings  of the  food  aid 
assessment mission; 
•  Fuel aid from Member States with Commission support for transport and monitoring aspects; 
•  Modification  of Council  Regulations  on  food  aid/food  security  in  order  to  include  the 
Independent States; 
•  Continued emergency humanitarian aid through ECHO; 
For component v) 
•  Consideration of  exceptional financial assistance, for humanitarian purposes, in the context of 
the expected IMF stand-by agreements {Georgia and Armenia) 
For component vi) 
•  Technical assistance for:  Enterprise support and institution-building, Restructuring of energy 
and agri~ulture sector,. regional integration, including TRACECA,  Tacis/ PHARE/Black Sea 
initiative, preparation for WTO membership, human  resoun~es development,  policy and legal 
advise. 
Tacis initiatives in the framework of such  a  policy would  need  to be considered within the 
context of  programming for 1996 and subsequent years. 
For component vii) 
•  Cooperation  with  international  donors  (US,  Canada,  Japan,  Russia,· Turkmenistan;  IFis; 
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